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This paper examines the effect of terrorism and warfare on international trade. We investigate 
bilateral trade flows between more than 200 countries over the period from 1960 to 1993. 
Applying an augmented gravity model that includes several measures of terrorism and large-
scale violence, we find compelling evidence that terrorist actions reduce the volume of trade; 
a doubling in the number of terrorist incidents is associated with a decrease in bilateral trade 
by about 4 percent. 
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 1. Outline 
In this short paper, we examine the impact of terrorism and warfare on international 
trade. To identify the effect of terrorism on trade empirically, we apply a gravity model of 
trade and add several measures of terrorist activity, internal instability and external conflict. 
We find that violence strongly affects the pattern of trade; countries that are plagued by a 
larger number of terrorist attacks trade significantly less with each other than otherwise 
similar countries that do not suffer from terrorism. This finding is robust for a number of 
modifications, including a large and diverse set of alternative violence measures.   
 
The remainder of the paper is in four parts. Section 2 discusses the association 
between terrorism and trade. Section 3 describes the empirical approach and the data. Section 
4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Discussion on terrorism and trade 
A large and diverse body of literature (mainly in political science) has already 
documented the relationship between political variables and international trade. One line of 
research focuses on the impact of trade on political conflict. Polachek (1980), for example, 
argues that mutual trade dependencies diminish hostility and promote cooperation. Another 
line of research studies the impact of political factors on trade. Pollins (1989), for example, 
argues that diplomatic cooperation increases bilateral trade. Morrow, Siverson and Tabares 
(1998) find that trade flows are greater between countries with common interests and similar 
democratic institutions. Recent theoretical contributions that explore issues of the protection 
of property rights, security and trade include Grossman (2001) and Skaperdas and Syropoulos 
(2001). The empirical literature is surveyed, among others, in Barbieri and Schneider (1999) 
and Reuveny (1999-2000). 
  1This paper is closely related to the literature that assesses the political determinants of 
international trade flows. In contrast to previous work, however, that mainly analyzes more 
general measures of conflict and political cooperation, we focus directly on terrorist activity 
and internal and external instability. 
While the impact of terrorism on trade may vary across time and place, violence and 
warfare generally imply additional costs for transactions so that, if anything, we would expect 
a negative association between terrorist activity and the volume of trade. More specifically, 
there are at least three principal ways in which warfare may be a hindrance to international 
trade. First, terrorism leads to insecurity and thereby raises the costs of doing business. 
Buckelew (1984, p. 18) defines terrorism as “violent, criminal behavior designed primarily to 
generate fear in the community, or in a substantial segment of the community, for political 
purposes” (emphasis added). Depending on the dimension of terrorist attacks, people may 
become increasingly confused, get nervous, or feel generally less safe. For instance, after “18 
months of random violence that has killed close to 400 citizens, injured thousands, and 
distressed millions, … the atmosphere in Israel [is] a mix of defiance and despair.” (The 
Economist, March 30, 2002). The collapse of the twin towers on September 11, 2001 was a 
laming shock to the US economy, whose full impact remains to be measured. Terrorism may 
even lead to changes in a country’s consumption and production patterns (e.g., Israelis now 
prefer malls instead of markets and walk in the streets instead of taking buses), thereby 
affecting the pattern of international trade. But terrorism-induced insecurity may also have a 
direct negative effect on trade. Since the economic impact of terrorist bombings and shootings 
are hardly predictable, existing business plans may quickly become obsolete so that firms 
generally face larger risks. Such insecurity may reduce the attractiveness of this market for 
international producers. 
Second, the typical response to an increase in terrorist activity is an increase in 
security measures. Stronger security regulations, however, imply that trade becomes more 
  2expensive, such as by increasing delivery times. For instance, after the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, US borders were temporarily closed; trucks on the border between 
Canada and the US had to wait up to 20 hours for a crossing that normally takes minutes.
1 El 
Al, Israel’s airline, generally holds goods for a day for security checks (The Economist, 
September 22, 2001). 
Third, there is the risk of a direct destruction of traded goods. While most terrorist 
attacks do not aim to cause direct economic damage, there is also a growing tendency to 
cripple countries economically. Terrorists target a country’s trade because countries appear to 
be particularly vulnerable to the disruption of industry supply chains or the destruction of 
particular transport modes. For instance, according to the terrorism database of the US State 
Department (2002), there were not less than 178 bombings against a multinational oil pipeline 
in Colombia in 2001 alone.  
Despite these clearly identifiable channels, the overall magnitude of the effect of 
terrorism on trade remains a priori unclear. In fact, it is even possible that terrorism has 
almost no measurable effect on trade since the overwhelming majority of terrorist actions are 
operations with only local implications. Also, terrorists rarely target freight directly and 
physical losses are, at least in principle, insurable. 
In the next sections, we explore the association between terrorist activity and 
international trade empirically. 
 
3. Methodology and data 
Our empirical approach to identify the effect of terrorism on trade can be summarized 
as follows: 
 
                                                           
1 For a detailed account of the impact of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 on 
international trade, see Walkenhorst and Dihel (2002). 
  3(1)  Tradeij = α  + β  Terror + γ  Z + ε  
 
where we regress (the log of) bilateral trade between countries i and j (Tradeij) on our 
measure of terrorist activity (Terror) and a set of other conditioning variables Z that have the 
potential to affect the bilateral volume of trade, with ε  being a well behaved residual.  
The control variables in vector Z are borrowed from the gravity equation which is a 
long-established and empirically highly successful framework to model trade flows. Hence, 
our basic regression framework is fairly conventional:
2 
 
(2) Tradeij = α  + β  Terror + γ 1 Dij + γ 2 YiYj + γ 3 YiYj/PopiPopj + γ 4 Language  
+ γ 5 Border + γ 6 Colonizer + γ 7 Nation + γ 8 Colony + ε  
 
where D is distance, Y is real GDP, Pop is population (all in natural logs), Language is a 
dummy that takes the value of one if i and j share a common language, Border is a common 
border dummy, Colonizer is a common colonizer dummy, Nation is a common nation dummy 
(e.g., for French overseas departments), and Colony takes the value of one if i colonized j or 
vice versa.
3 
Our data come from a number of different sources. The data for the dependent and the 
Z variables are taken from Glick and Rose (2002), who have constructed a comprehensive 
                                                           
2 The approach is similar to other recent work in empirical international trade where 
augmented gravity models have been applied to identify the impact of regional trading blocs 
(e.g., Frankel, 1997), national borders (e.g., McCallum, 1995), and currency unions (e.g., 
Rose, 2000) on trade. More importantly for our purposes, this approach is also widely used in 
the political science literature to assess the impact of political factors on trade (e.g., Morrow 
et al., 1998).  
3 Note that our dependent variable is the total volume of bilateral trade so that we are unable 
to distinguish between an exporting and an importing country and our explanatory variables 
enter the regression jointly for country i and j (usually as a product). So, to be more precise, 
also our terrorism variable takes the form TerroriTerrorj   In principle, however, one might 
  4data set that covers (real) bilateral trade between 217 countries and territories between 1948 
and 1997 and also provide information on all the other standard gravity variables.
4 To this 
data set, we add four types of controls for Terror. In a first exercise, we explore direct 
measures of terrorism; this is our main variable of interest. Raw data of terrorist activity are 
available from Mickolus (1980) who provides a detailed chronology of terrorist events around 
the world for the period from 1968 to 1979.
5 Mickolus (1980, p. xiii) defines terrorism as “the 
use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing extranormal violence for political purposes […] 
when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider 
than the immediate victims and when […] its ramifications transcend national boundaries.” 
The types of politically motivated incidents included in his data set are: kidnapping, 
barricade-hostage taking, occupation, letter bombing, incendiary bombing, explosive 
bombing, missile attack, armed attack, aerial hijacking, nonaerial takeover; assassination or 
murder, sabotage, exotic pollution, nuclear weapons threat, theft or break-in, conspiracy, 
hoax, sniping, shootouts with police and arms smuggling. 
Based on this information, we construct three variables of terrorist activity: the yearly 
number of terrorist events, the total number of terrorist events between 1968 and 1979, and a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one for at least one terrorist action. Following 
Mickolus, we treat each incident equally; we do not distinguish between either the types of 
incidents or their severity or any other characteristic (such as the number of casualties).
6 It 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
also make the case for braking up trade between exports and imports, allowing to explore 
whether terrorism has a greater impact in the exporting or the importing country. 
4 The data set is graciously provided by Andrew Rose on his website 
(http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose). In our actual analysis, we use different subsets of this 
large (>400,000 observations) panel data set according to the availability of data for our 
variable of interest. 
5 One of Mickolus’s collaborators, Todd Sandler, has informed us that the published data for 
the years 1978 and 1979 may be incorrect. We have checked the robustness of our results and 
find that none of our results is affected when information for the last two years is excluded. 
6 Mickolus’s (1980) data does not allow us to weight severity of terrorist incidents. Ideally, 
one would distinguish terrorist attacks by the amount of media coverage since many terrorists 
  5should also be noted that Mickolus’s data is on transnational terrorism. Mickolus (1980, p. 
xix) notes that: “[While] the bulk of politically violent incidents may occur in third world 
nations […], nearly half of all attacks are recorded in westernized democracies. Transnational 
attacks are very infrequent in Asia and Africa.” Table 1 shows the five countries that, 
according to our measures, suffered most strongly from terrorism. 
A second group of variables focuses on measures of internal instability other than 
terrorism. These measures include the number of politically motivated murders or attempted 
murders of high government officials or politicians (Assassinations); the number of any 
armed activities, sabotage, or bombings carried out by independent bands of citizens or 
irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime (Guerrilla activity); the 
number of jailings or executions of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the 
opposition (Purges); the number of violent demonstrations or clashes of more than 100 
citizens involving the use of physical force (Riots); and the number of any illegal or forced 
changes in the top governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or 
unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government 
(Revolutions). The original source for this information is Banks (1979), but the data are also 
available in an updated version from Easterly and Sewadeh (2002). 
In a third set of controls, we analyze structural variables that aim to capture the extent 
to which a country’s resources are devoted to the reduction of military conflicts. In particular, 
we use defense expenditures as a share of GDP (Defense) taken from the International 
Monetary Fund’s Government Financial Statistics and the size of armed forces as a fraction of 
the country’s total population (Military) obtained from Easterly and Sewadeh (2002). The 
idea is that, unless countries are outright aggressors, a larger share of resources spent on 
national defense should indicate a greater risk to internal and external threats. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
seek public attention; see Mickolus and Simmons (1997). Also, there is no separation between 
state sponsored terrorism and non-state sponsored terrorism. 
  6Finally, we explore measures of external conflict. In this respect, Barro and Lee 
(1994) provide two variables that appear to be particularly appropriate to identify the impact 
of warfare on trade and are therefore used in our analysis: a dummy variable for countries that 
participated in at least one external war over the period 1960-1985 and the fraction of time 
over 1960-1985 each country was involved in an external war. 




We begin our investigation by estimating equation (2), augmented with our measures 
of terrorist activity. The results are presented in Table 2. For the sake of completeness, we 
report the estimates on the entire set of regressors, but later we will focus exclusively on our 
variables of interest, since all coefficients on the standard gravity variables take the expected 
sign and are statistically and economically significant. For instance, trade increases with both 
higher GDP and higher GDP per capita (for the country pairing) and falls the greater the 
distance between two countries. 
In a first exercise, we enter the (log interacted) number of terrorist attacks as (an 
additional) explanatory variable for the bilateral volume of trade. The estimated β  coefficient 
is indeed negative and, with a t-statistic of about 6, statistically highly significant. The effect 
is also economically large; the point estimate of -0.04 implies that a doubling in the number of 
terrorist incidents (a rise by 100 percent) is associated with a decrease in bilateral trade by 
about 4 percent, holding all other things constant. This is in our view a very strong result since 
it implies that trade is already sizably reduced in the same (calendar) year in which a terrorist 
incident occurs. 
In the next two columns of Table 2, we explore our two alternative measures of 
terrorist activity and find similar results. The coefficient on the (additively linked) dummy of 
  7at least one terrorist action (that can take values of 0, 1, or 2) implies that the first terrorist 
incident in a country pair reduces bilateral trade by almost 10 percent; a pair of countries in 
which one country suffers from terrorist attack(s) trades only about 91 percent (exp[-
0.10]=0.91) of what the two countries would trade if they were completely free from acts of 
terrorism. Also, replacing the number of terrorist actions per year with the total number of 
terrorist actions over a 12-year period has little effect on the results. The estimated β  
coefficient is even a bit larger, probably capturing the trade effects that are not visible already 
in the same year of an attack.
7 We have performed additional sensitivity analysis in order to 
establish the robustness of our results. For instance, we have dropped OECD countries. We 
have also analyzed different time periods separately. Our estimates were robust to these 
perturbations (as were all other findings reported in this paper). 
To summarize, there is compelling evidence that terrorist activity negatively affect 
bilateral trade flows. Countries targeted by terrorism trade significantly less with each other 
than countries unaffected by terrorism. 
In the following, we explore the effect of other measures of internal and external 
conflict on international trade. We begin with alternative measures of internal instability; 
results are reported in table 3. For each of the five main variables Assassinations, Guerrilla 
activities, Purges, Riots, and Revolutions, we follow our approach for the terrorism variable 
and construct three separate measures. A first measure gives again the number of relevant 
incidents for each year. As before, we consider this test to be very strong since a significant 
coefficient on this variable would imply that any additional incident has a measurable effect 
on trade already in the same year it occurs. A more reliable measure therefore might be the 
                                                           
7 In unreported results, we find that the total number of terrorist actions is indeed the clearly 
dominant variable. If one enters the different terrorism measures jointly, only the estimate on 
the total number of attacks remains negative and statistically significant, though the results 
may suffer from multicollinearity. Nevertheless, this finding suggests that it is mainly the 
long-run average of terrorist activities that affects international trade rather than some brief 
periods of isolated attacks or the fact that a country has suffered any terrorist action. 
  8average number of relevant incidents, our second variable. Finally, we have constructed 
frequency measures, based on the number of years in which relevant incidents have occurred.  
In table 3, each line gives the results of a separate regression; the regressions include 
the full set of gravity variables, but, to save space, we report only the estimated β  coefficient 
and some diagnostic statistics. Reviewing the results, all of the coefficient estimates on our 
internal instability measures are indeed negative and statistically highly significant. Thus, all 
kinds of domestic violence appear to sizably reduce trade, irrespective of whether it takes the 
form of assassinations, guerrilla activities, purges, riots, or revolutions. While we consider 
these results as particularly encouraging, the estimates appear to be unusually strong. Could it 
be that our variables, though different, finally capture various aspects of the same event? We 
can convincingly reject this hypothesis. The bivariate correlations (though consistently 
positive) are often quite low. Also, if one enters the different instability measures jointly, the 
estimated coefficients are all negative and statistically significant (results are available from 
authors on request). 
In  a next step, we explore two structural variables that should capture the potential 
risk of military conflict. Armed forces that make up a relatively large share of a country’s 
total population as well as defense expenditures that represent a large fraction of GDP could 
both be indications of a country’s higher propensity to conflicts and warfare (including 
terrorism). Our results appear in table 4. In line with our intuition, the relative size of the 
military has a negative effect on bilateral trade. The coefficient is statistically and 
economically significant, implying that countries with large armed forces trade significantly 
less with each other than otherwise similar countries with relatively small armies. For defense 
expenditures, however, the estimated coefficient is positive and also highly significant – a 
finding that survives extensive robustness checks such as including the (log product of the) 
land areas as additional explanatory variable or splitting the sample into OECD and Non-
OECD countries. A potential explanation for this result is that large expenditures may indeed 
  9provide better security. If both variables enter our regression jointly, the results are essentially 
unchanged from the default specifications. 
Our final exercise aims to identify the impact of external conflict on trade. As shown 
in table 5, there is strong evidence that a country’s participation in an external war reduces its 
volume of international trade. The estimated β  coefficients are negative and statistically and 
economically significant. The most interesting result, however, is recorded in the final column 
of table 5. When estimated jointly, the coefficient on the fraction of time involved in external 
wars is (significantly) positive, suggesting that it is mainly the fact whether a country has ever 
participated in a war that matters and not the length nor the frequency of wars.  
 
5. Summary 
It is plausible to assume that terrorism and large-scale violence has a negative effect 
on international trade. Higher risks, additional security measures and direct destructions raise 
the costs for transactions and should thereby lower the volume of international trade. In this 
paper, we have presented evidence confirming this intuitive claim. Applying an augmented 
gravity model and analyzing bilateral trade flows between more than 200 countries over the 
period from 1960 through 1993, we find compelling evidence that terrorist actions reduce the 
volume of trade; this result is robust to alternative measures of political instability and 
military conflict. Our estimates suggest that a doubling in the number of terrorist incidents in 
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Description of Data on Terrorist Activity
Five countries that suffered most strongly from terrorism; Period: 1968-79
a) Number of Terrorist Actions b) Total Number of Terrorist Actions
Country Year Number Country Number
United States 1975 41 United States 288
United States 1976 35 Argentina 192
United Kingdom 1974 34 France 163
Argentina 1973 34 United Kingdom 149
Argentina 1976 33 Israel 135
France 1976 31
Argentina 1974 31
United States 1978 30
United States 1977 29
United States 1974 28
United States 1968 27

















Source: calculated from Mickolus (1980)Table 2
The Impact of Terrorism on Trade
Dependent variable: (Log) Bilateral Trade
Period: 1968-1979 (1) (2) (3)
(Log Product) 1+Number of -0.041**
Terrorist Actions (0.007)
(Sum Dummy) At least -0.098**
one Terrorist Action, 1968-79 (0.018)
(Log Product) 1+Total Number -0.065**
of Terrorist Actions, 1968-79 (0.005)
(Log) Distance -1.054** -1.053** -1.055**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
(Log Product) Real GDP  0.804**  0.800**  0.825**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
(Log Product) Real GDP  0.532**  0.550**  0.547**
per capita (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Common Language  0.315**  0.312**  0.320**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Common Land Border  0.336**  0.361**  0.339**
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Common Colonizer  0.761**  0.783**  0.745**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Same Nation  1.310**  1.221**  1.254**
(0.277) (0.280) (0.279)
Colonial Relationship  1.832**  1.795**  1.867**
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043)
No. of observations 61 013 59 780 61 013
S.E.R. 1,84 1,84 1,84
Adj. R
2 0,63 0,63 0,63
Notes: OLS estimation with (unreported) year effects. White heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ** denotes significant at the 1% level. 
Data sources are described in the text.Table 3
The Impact of Internal Instability on Trade
Dependent variable: (Log) Bilateral Trade No. of
Period: 1960-1993 Coefficient Observations S.E.R. Adj. R
2
(Log Product) 1+Number -0.160** 148 574 2,09 0,63
of Assassinations (0.010)
(Log Product) 1+Average -0.622** 163 327 2,06 0,63
Number of Assassinations, 1960-93 (0.014)
(Log Product) 1+Number of Years with -0.224** 170 725 2,06 0,62
at least one Assassination, 1960-93 (0.004)
(Log Product) 1+Number -0.183** 148 574 2,09 0,63
of Guerrilla Activities (0.011)
(Log Product) 1+Average -0.416** 163 327 2,07 0,62
Number of Guerrilla Activities, 1960-93 (0.018)
(Log Product) 1+Number of Years with -0.120** 170 725 2,07 0,62
at least one Guerrilla Activity, 1960-93 (0.004)
(Log Product) 1+Number -0.163** 148 574 2,09 0,63
of Purges (0.014)
(Log Product) 1+Average -1.021** 140 594 1,99 0,65
Number of Purges, 1960-93 (0.029)
(Log Product) 1+Number of Years -0.229** 147 028 1,99 0,64
with at least one Purge, 1960-93 (0.005)
(Log Product) 1+Number -0.091** 148 574 2,09 0,63
of Riots (0.007)
(Log Product) 1+Average -0.096** 140 594 1,99 0,65
Number of Riots, 1960-93 (0.010)
(Log Product) 1+Number of Years -0.132** 147 028 2,00 0,64
with at least one Riot, 1960-93 (0.005)
(Log Product) 1+Number -0.145** 148 574 2,09 0,63
of Revolutions (0.016)
(Log Product) 1+Average -0.837** 140 594 1,99 0,65
Number of Revolutions, 1960-93 (0.031)
(Log Product) 1+Number of Years -0.219** 147 028 1,99 0,65
with at least one Revolution, 1960-93 (0.005)
Notes: OLS estimation with (unreported) year effects. Other regressors not shown in the table: constant, 
log Distance, log GDPs, log per capita GDPs,  Common Language, Common Border, Common Colonizer, 
Colonial Relationship. White heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
** denotes significant at the 1% level. Data sources are described in the text.Table 4
The Impact of Military Personnel and Defense Expenditures on Trade
Dependent variable: (Log) Bilateral Trade
Period: 1972-1982
(Log Product) Size of  -3.637** -15.120**
Military/Population (0.994)  (1.841)
(Log Product) Defense  0.148**   0.218**
Expenditures/GDP (0.011)  (0.015)
No. of observations 46 105 16 394 13 876
S.E.R. 1,87 1,70 1,62
Adj. R
2 0,64 0,71 0,72
Notes: OLS estimation with (unreported) year effects. Other regressors not shown in the
table: constant, log Distance, log GDPs, log per capita GDPs,  Common Language,
Common Border, Common Colonizer, Colonial Relationship. White
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ** denotes significant at the
1% level. Data sources are described in the text.Table 5
The Impact of War on Trade
Dependent variable: (Log) Bilateral Trade
Period: 1960-1985 (1) (2) (3)
(Sum Dummy) Participation in  -0.338** -0.368**
at least one External War, 1960-85 (0.010) (0.012)
(Log Product) 1+Fraction of Time -0.395**  0.152**
Involved in External War, 1960-85 (0.028) (0.034)
No. of observations 95 187 95 187 95 187
S.E.R. 1,80 1,81 1,80
Adj. R
2 0,64 0,64 0,64
Notes: OLS estimation with (unreported) year effects. Other regressors not shown in the
table: constant, log Distance, log GDPs, log per capita GDPs,  Common Language,
Common Border, Common Colonizer, Colonial Relationship. White
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ** denotes significant at the
1% level. Data sources are described in the text.Appendix 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mnemonic Period Sample Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(Log Product) 1+Number of Terrorist Actions TER 1969-78 111 243 1,00 1,16 0,00 7,11
(Sum Dummy) At least one Terrorist Action TERD 1969-78 76 441 1,58 0,57 0,00 2,00
(Log Product) 1+Total Number of Terrorist Actions TERT 1969-78 111 243 3,41 2,31 0,00 10,93
(Log Product) Defense Expenditures/GDP DEF 1972-93 89 684 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,08
(Log Product) Size of Military/Population MIL 1960-82 35 465 1,67 1,36 -6,00 15,30
(Log Product) 1+Number of Assassinations ASN 1960-93 178 551 0,21 0,50 0,00 5,97
(Log Product) 1+Average Number of Assassinations ASNA 1960-93 199 430 0,31 0,34 0,00 2,39
(Log Product) 1+Number of Years with at least one Assassination ASNY 1960-93 219 315 1,92 1,29 0,00 5,60
(Log Product) 1+Number of Guerrilla Activities GUE 1960-93 178 551 0,28 0,48 0,00 5,50
(Log Product) 1+Average Number of Guerrilla Activities GUEA 1960-93 199 430 0,38 0,32 0,00 1,86
(Log Product) 1+Number of Years with at least one Guerrilla Activity GUEY 1960-93 219 315 2,39 1,63 0,00 6,77
(Log Product) 1+Number of Purges PUR 1960-93 178 551 0,14 0,38 0,00 5,16
(Log Product) 1+Average Number of Purges PURA 1960-93 174 011 0,22 0,19 0,00 1,42
(Log Product) 1+Number of Years with at least one Purge PURY 1960-93 191 622 1,80 1,20 0,00 5,12
(Log Product) 1+Number of Riots RIO 1960-93 178 551 0,49 0,79 0,00 7,43
(Log Product) 1+Average Number of Riots RIOA 1960-93 174 011 0,71 0,62 0,00 4,23
(Log Product) 1+Number of Years with at least one Riot RIOY 1960-93 191 622 2,92 1,39 0,00 6,77
(Log Product) 1+Number of Revolutions REV 1960-93 178 551 0,20 0,38 0,00 2,89
(Log Product) 1+Average Number of Revolutions REVA 1960-93 174 011 0,25 0,22 0,00 2,35
(Log Product) 1+Number of Years with at least one Revolution REVY 1960-93 191 622 2,05 1,36 0,00 6,04
(Sum Dummy) Participation in at least one External War WARD 1960-85 137 570 0,75 0,68 0,00 2,00
(Log Product) 1+Fraction of Time Involved in External War WART 1960-85 137 570 0,15 0,23 0,00 2,00
(Log of) Bilateral Trade TRAD 1960-93 319 944 10,67 3,70 -16,12 23,67
(Log of) Distance DIST 1960-93 235 552 8,14 0,83 3,68 9,42
(Log of) Real GDP GDP 1960-93 174 716 47,82 2,67 35,39 57,49
(Log of) Real GDP per capita GDPC 1960-93 174 716 16,06 1,44 11,52 20,90
Common Border Dummy BORD 1960-93 319 944 0,02 0,14 0,00 1,00
Common Language Dummy LANG 1960-93 319 944 0,16 0,37 0,00 1,00
Common Colonizer Dummy COL 1960-93 319 944 0,07 0,25 0,00 1,00
Colony Dummy CLNY 1960-93 319 944 0,02 0,12 0,00 1,00Appendix 2
Simple Bivariate Correlations
TER TERD TERT DEF MIL ASN ASNA ASNY GUE GUEA GUEY PUR PURA PURY RIO RIOA RIOY REV REVA REVY WARD WART TRAD DIST GDP GDPC BORD LANG COL CLNY
TER 1,00
TERD 0,23 1,00
TERT 0,80 0,49 1,00
DEF 0,13 0,14 0,17 1,00
MIL 0,19 0,23 0,31 0,50 1,00
ASN 0,18 0,09 0,29 0,01 0,04 1,00
ASNA 0,27 0,18 0,49 -0,02 0,02 0,51 1,00
ASNY 0,31 0,21 0,51 0,15 0,13 0,38 0,82 1,00
GUE 0,26 0,15 0,24 0,10 -0,04 0,34 0,36 0,30 1,00
GUEA 0,19 0,24 0,38 0,14 -0,02 0,28 0,62 0,65 0,52 1,00
GUEY 0,19 0,26 0,33 0,19 0,04 0,28 0,57 0,67 0,52 0,91 1,00
PUR 0,10 0,02 -0,02 0,12 0,12 0,06 0,08 0,14 0,16 0,13 0,13 1,00
PURA 0,02 0,14 0,07 0,25 0,18 0,14 0,30 0,45 0,14 0,50 0,45 0,39 1,00
PURY 0,00 0,08 0,02 0,17 0,08 0,19 0,38 0,47 0,25 0,59 0,59 0,32 0,87 1,00
RIO 0,17 0,08 0,17 0,06 0,07 0,31 0,42 0,41 0,30 0,38 0,35 0,19 0,26 0,28 1,00
RIOA 0,28 0,16 0,42 0,20 0,15 0,28 0,60 0,74 0,23 0,59 0,58 0,15 0,40 0,35 0,48 1,00
RIOY 0,24 0,16 0,42 0,16 0,16 0,27 0,59 0,76 0,27 0,65 0,70 0,19 0,56 0,58 0,44 0,82 1,00
REV 0,05 -0,06 0,00 0,14 0,02 0,26 0,08 0,09 0,38 0,23 0,23 0,39 0,23 0,24 0,18 0,07 0,11 1,00
REVA 0,02 -0,06 -0,05 0,25 -0,06 0,08 0,24 0,33 0,35 0,58 0,61 0,20 0,47 0,52 0,19 0,23 0,35 0,38 1,00
REVY 0,02 -0,14 -0,09 0,25 -0,02 0,12 0,27 0,38 0,35 0,60 0,66 0,21 0,50 0,58 0,26 0,29 0,43 0,37 0,93 1,00
WARD 0,09 0,12 0,10 0,38 0,15 0,04 0,27 0,45 0,17 0,46 0,52 0,12 0,40 0,45 0,16 0,32 0,35 0,18 0,56 0,59 1,00
WART 0,12 0,11 0,18 0,26 0,01 0,10 0,15 0,19 0,24 0,33 0,33 0,14 0,23 0,20 0,01 0,10 0,06 0,26 0,46 0,34 0,50 1,00
TRAD 0,30 0,32 0,58 0,08 0,15 0,17 0,19 0,13 0,05 0,05 0,01 -0,06 -0,06 -0,13 0,11 0,31 0,19 -0,08 -0,26 -0,29 -0,19 -0,11 1,00
DIST -0,06 0,07 -0,04 -0,04 -0,11 -0,05 0,05 0,13 0,00 0,08 0,14 0,04 0,05 0,09 -0,01 0,08 0,11 -0,02 0,02 0,01 0,06 -0,02 -0,28 1,00
GDP 0,34 0,41 0,70 0,06 0,06 0,23 0,38 0,36 0,15 0,29 0,25 -0,02 0,13 0,08 0,24 0,56 0,46 -0,05 -0,12 -0,14 -0,05 -0,04 0,77 0,01 1,00
GDPC 0,21 0,37 0,53 -0,10 0,30 0,06 0,03 -0,06 -0,14 -0,29 -0,30 -0,15 -0,31 -0,39 -0,10 -0,05 -0,09 -0,24 -0,58 -0,62 -0,49 -0,31 0,61 -0,05 0,53 1,00
BORD 0,02 -0,01 0,01 -0,03 -0,06 0,01 -0,01 -0,04 0,01 0,00 -0,02 -0,03 -0,03 -0,01 0,01 0,01 -0,04 0,00 -0,03 -0,04 -0,03 -0,04 0,16 -0,44 0,06 -0,01 1,00
LANG -0,04 -0,16 -0,12 0,09 0,00 -0,04 -0,05 0,02 -0,06 -0,07 -0,03 -0,01 -0,07 -0,12 0,03 0,09 0,00 -0,03 -0,01 0,01 0,03 -0,05 0,02 -0,04 -0,06 -0,08 0,09 1,00
COL -0,11 -0,07 -0,19 0,06 0,03 -0,06 -0,06 -0,02 -0,01 0,05 0,04 -0,05 -0,05 -0,04 0,03 0,01 -0,07 -0,04 0,02 0,07 0,12 0,00 -0,15 -0,13 -0,25 -0,22 0,07 0,22 1,00
CLNY 0,12 0,03 0,15 0,00 -0,01 0,10 0,14 0,16 0,13 0,14 0,14 -0,03 -0,02 -0,01 0,11 0,13 0,14 0,03 0,05 0,07 -0,07 -0,05 0,17 0,00 0,13 0,07 0,01 0,26 -0,04 1,00